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Mr. Carrick submits this Supplemental Reply Brief pursuant to the Order of the
Court, dated June 18, 2019, addressing "trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate alibi
witnesses and to present a timeline of [Carrick's] whereabouts during the time of the
burglary." See Order, datedJune 18,2019,11 (See AddendumAto the Supplemental Brief
of Appellant).
ARGUMENTS
I. BYFAILING TO ADEQUATELYINVESTIGATEMATT
BISHOP AS AN ALIBI WITNESS AND INTRODUCE A
SOLID TIMELINE OF MR. CARRICK'S
WHEREABOUTS DURING THE BURGLARY, TRIAL
COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL.
The State contends that Mr. Carrick's claim fails because he cannot show deficient
performance. S'ee State's Second Supplemental BriefofAppellee, p. 12 etseq. However,
the State's fails to take intoconsideration all of the facts andcircumstances of this caseas
this Court is required to do when analyzing an ineffective assistance ofcounsel claim.
A. Trial Counsel's Failure to Adequately Investigate
Matt Bishop as an Alibi Witness Constituted
Deficient Performance in Light ofAll the Facts and
Circumstances of this Case.
According to the two-prong test inStricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,104 S.Ct
2052 (1984), adefendant must first show that counsel rendered deficient performance in
some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the
defendant.' Id. at 687,104 S.Ct. at 2064; see also State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, t ^6,26
P.3d 203; State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,119, 12 P.3d 92; Bundy v. Deland, 16i P.2d
803, 805 (Utah 1988); State v. Craft, 2017 UT App 87, t 16, 397 P.3d 889; Stkte v.
Stidham, 2014 UT App 32, f 18, 320 P.3d 696. "Thus, a court deciding an actual
ineffectiveness claimmustjudge the reasonableness ofcounsel's challengedconduct
facts ofthe particular case, viewed as ofthe time ofcounsel's conduct." Id. at690.
court must thendetermine whether, in lightofall thecircumstances, the identified acts or




(emphasis added); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,480,120 S.Ct. 1029 (2000)
(stating "courts must take into account all the information counsel knew or should have
known.") (citingStrickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (focusing onthe totalityofthe circumstances)).
Contrary to the State's argument, all the facts and circumstances ofthis particular
case include the following: that in April 2015 - almost ten months prior to trial - Mr.
Carrick provided trial counsel with Matt Bishop's name as an alibi witness along with Mr.
Bishop's contact information (See Finding ofFact No. 12, R. 767-77; accord Finding of
Fact No. 36, R. Ill) {See Addendum Ctothe Supplemental BriefofAppellant); that
fall of 2015, trial counsel had not yet contacted Mr. Bishop and that trial counsel
in the
again
asked for Mr. Bishop's contact information {See Finding ofFact No. 13, R. 768); that as
'The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, "In all
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance ofCounsel for his
defence." U.S. Const, amend. VI.
criminal
late as a couple of days before trial, Mr. Carrick learned that trial counsel had not yet
contacted Mr. Bishop and that he was therefore provided with Mr. Bishop's work
information (fee Finding ofFactNo. 14, R. 768; see also Finding ofFact No. 16, R. 768-69
and Finding of Fact No. 38, R. 773).
Consistent with the above findings offact and contrary to the State's assertion that
trial counsel did not procrastinate his investigation ofMr. Bishop, the remand court found
that Mr. Bishop never met trial counsel prior to trial {See Finding ofFact No. 33, R. 112).
Rather, Mr. Bishop spoke with trial counsel by phone for "about three minutes" the day
before trial {See id.). Moreover, the remand court found that Mr. Bishop felt that trial
counsel "should have asked himwho was atthefuneral withhim."{See Finding ofFactNo.
34, 772).
The remand court's findings regarding trial counsel's testimony on remand include
the following: that trial counsel had been provided with Mr. Bishop's name as an alibi
witness substantially before trial along with his contact information {See Finding ofFact
No. 49, R. 777). Additionally, the remand court found that it "took a while" for trial
counsel to find Mr. Bishop because trial counsel claimed "he was hard to find" - and that
trial counsel did not contact Mr. Bishop until "a day ortwo before trial. {See id.).
Trial counsel rendered deficient performance byfailing tocontact Mr. Bishop until
shortly before trial - even though Mr. Bishop was readily available. Mr. Bishop's
availability is demonstrated by his being contacted by Mr. Carrick and his sister upon their
learning - just acouple ofdays before trial - that trial counsel had still not contactedMr.
Bishop in preparation for trial (See Finding ofFact No. 38, R. 773 (finding that Mr. Carrick
contacted Mr. Bishop through Facebook and requesting that he call trial counsel about the
impending jury trial); see also Finding ofFact No. 14, R. 768).'
The State claims that because Mr. Carrick gave trial counsel only thefollowing four
names ofpotential alibi witnesses: Tawnie Malmberg; Celeste McCulley; Elias Karras; and
Matt Bishop (R. 773:228-29), trial counsel could"reasonably conclude" that these wcsre the
"strongest alibi witnesses and that [Mr. Carrick] did not believe any additiona
witnesses would benecessary." See State's Second Supplemental BriefofAppellee,
This argument -however- is inconsistent with trial counsel's duty to investigate disc
in Strickland, where the Court stated that "counsel has a duty to make reasc
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investig
unnecessary." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. This - the Court emphasized - "must be
directly assessed for reasonableness inall the circumstances " Id.
Trialcounsel'sdecisionnottoreasonably investigate alibiwitnesses cannotbe
simply on the fact that the names were provided by the client. Mr. Carrick provid(;d the
names ofpotential alibi witnesses so that trial counsel could investigate and determins; their
viability as alibi witnesses, which counsel failed to do. In fact, three ofthe four potential
alibi witnesses, Tawnie Malmberg, Celeste McCulley, and Elias Karras were not tru(; alibi







Mr. Carrick during arguably the most critical point in time for purposes ofproviding alibi
testimony {See R. 595:19-25; R. 595-97; R. 603-04).
Had trial counsel adequately investigated Mr. Bishop as an important alibi witness,
he would have learned about Edith Dawson and Cheryl Stoker, the additional alibi
witnesses. BothMs. Dawson, a small business owner, and Ms. Stoker, who serves as a
Councilwoman for North Ogden City, would added much-needed credibility to Mr.
Carrick's defense as itwas presented at trial {See Finding ofFact Nos. 17-19 and 21-25).^
This is particularly important because trial counsel's defense focused on highlighting Mr.
Carrick's alibi. Both Ms. Dawson and Ms. Stoker - based on the evidence presented on
remand and theremand court's findings - were with and could account forMr. Carrick's
whereabouts from approximately 3:15 p.m. to6:45 p.m. on May 21,2014 {See R. 783:139-
40; R. 783:60-64; R. 783:76-80; R. 783:109-14; see also Findings ofFact Nos. 17-18 and
22-24).
On January 10, 2016, trial counsel filed an Alibi Witness List that did not include
eitherMs. Dawson or Ms. Stoker as alibiwitnesses {See R. 783:238-39; R. 72-73; Finding
ofFact No. 55). Trial counsel's deficient performance infailing to adequately investigate
Mr. Bishop as an important alibi witness is further demonstrated by the fact that by the time
^The State - for example- in its closing argument, contended that "[e]ither [Mr. Carrick]
was at the house that day and went in the window looking for something, or he wasn't" because
"he was with hisfriendsfrom the renaissancefriire and had nothing to do with it. (R. 642.19-
22 (emphasis added).
trial counsel had contacted Mr. Bishop the day before trial, itwas too late toproperly lotice
Ms. Dawson and Ms. Stoker as alibi witnesses in this case {See R. 783:253-54).
result, trial counsel rendered deficientperformance by failing to contact and speakwi
Bishop within a sufficient amount of time in order to reasonably determine ho\^ Ms.
Dawson and Ms. Stoker could provide alibi witness testimony that was critical l]o Mr.
Carrick's defense in this case.
Perhaps most glaring is the State's failure to effectively rebut the timeline njiatter.
By failing to adequately investigate the alibi witnesses in this case, including Mr. B
trialcounsel failedtoestablish afulltimeline ofMr. Carrick'swhereabouts andmovenents
before, during, and after the alleged burglary in this case. Trial counsel knew that Mr.
Bishop was an important alibi witness in this case {See R. 783:259:7-10 (trial cc
testifying that Mr. Bishop was "pretty important" because "he was adriver ofavehic
[Mr. Carrick] was in")). Nevertheless, trial counsel did not speak with Mr. Bishop un
day before trial and then for only a few minutes by phone {See R. 783:115:13-2
783:118:13-17; R. 783:245:17-24).
On remand, Mr. Carrick presented a full timeline detailing his whereabou
movements before, during, and after the alleged burglary inthis case {See R. 783:138-55;









^See Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2(1) (requiring that anotice ofalibi witnesses be f
less than 10 days before trial or atsuch other time as the court may allow").
led "not
development ofafull timeline included both time and distance calculations of23 minutes
and 15 seconds and 15.7 miles for the trip between Gillies Funeral Chapel and Rack's
Barber Shop (See R. 783:139:6-9; R. 783:183-85).
The funeral services for April Taylorconcluded at 5:04 p.m. (R. 783:15-17). Shortly
thereafter, the balloon release inthe parking lot ofGillies Funeral Chapel occurred at5:17
p.m. (R. 783:142:4-15; R. 783:11:11-23). Mr. Carrick and the group ofindividuals with
whom he traveled to the funeral services, namely, EdithDawson, Cheryl Stoker, andMatt
Bishop, remained in the parking lot of Gillies Funeral Chapel socializing until
approximately 5:47 p.m. (See R. 783:60-64; R. 783:76-80; R. 783:86-96; R. 783:109-14;
R. 783:138-44; R. 783:185:10-12).
At approximately 5:47 p.m., Mr. Carrick, Ms. Dawson, Ms. Stoker, and Mr. Bishop
left the parking lot inthe same vehicles and returned to Rack's Barber Shop (See R. 783:62-
64; R. 783:77-79; R. 783:114:11 -25; R. 783:142:20-23; R. 783:185:10-12). After arriving
atRack's Barber Shop, the group - including Mr. Carrick - entered the barber shop and
visited for about 30 minutes about the funeral (See R. 783:63-64; R. 783:79:4-15; R.
783:114:22-25; R. 783:142-44; R. 783:185:10-12). When they finished visiting at
approximately 6:45 p.m., the group - including Mr. Carrick - split up and left Rack's
Barber Shop, with Mr. Carrick turning south onto Hwy 89 towards Ogden (See R.
783:79:16-19; R. 783:119:14-21; R. 783:143-44; R. 783:185:10-12).
As shown bythe Call-Detail Report, the 911 call ofthe alleged burglary in th
was made at 6:03 p.m., on May 21, 2014, with the complainant stating that the a
scase
leged
burglary had concluded 10 minutes earlier (See R. 783:144:11-22; R. 783:9-11). Based on
the timeline evidence presented at the remand hearing, Mr. Carrick did not ha
opportunity to commit the alleged burglary in this case (i'eeR. 783:152-53; R. 783:205-06;
see also Finding ofFact No. 41 (finding that investigator concluded that Mr. Carrie
not have the opportunity to committhe burglary)).
According to trial counsel's testimony, "he went over the timeline with
Carrick]", discussing things such as "who was there, what [Mr. Carrick] was doing, \
car he was driving in, where they went, and the balloon release after the funeral.
Finding ofFact No. 51, R. 777). Nevertheless, trial counsel failed to adequately inve^igate
and obtain evidence, such as the Call-Detail Report, which clearly established wh<!n the
burglary took place - which, in turn was critical to establishing the impossibility c
Carrick having had the opportunity to commit theburglary.
The remand court found that trial counsel testified that if he called too man>
witnesses, the jury would tune him out" and that the alibi witnesses that he presented
sufficient." (See Finding ofFact No. 52, R. 777). However, trial counsel's assertions are
inconsistent with the "duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasoaable










Trial counsel's failure to adequately investigate the critical alibi witnesses - in light ofthe
all the facts andcircumstances established onremand - was unreasonable.
Trial counsel rendered deficient performance infailing toadequately investigate the
alibi witnesses and failing to establish a full-timeline. By failing to duly investigate the
alibi witnesses and present evidence ofatimeline that established that Mr. Carrick did not
have the opportunity to commit the burglary, trial counsel's representation - under all the
circumstances of this case- fell below an objective standardof reasonableness.
B. Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance
Prejudiced Mr. Carrick.
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a defendant must proffer
sufficient evidence to support "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result ofthe proceedings would have been different." Strickland,
466 U.S. at694,104 S.Ct. at2068;^^ Litherland, 2000 UT 76 atH19; State v. Templin, 805
P.2d 182, 187 (1990). "Areasonable probability is aprobability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons v.
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,522 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966,115 S.Ct. 431 (1994); State
V. Frame, 12i P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). "[T]he right to the effective assistance of
counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because ofthe effect ithas on the ability of
^To show prejudice, "a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more
likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
the accused toreceive a fair trial." See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364,369,113 S.Ct.
838, 842, (1993).
Had trial counsel adequately investigated Mr. Bishop as an alibi witness, he would
have located two additional alibi witnesses, namely, Ms. Dawson and Ms. Stokei, who
would have provided critical credible alibi testimony that Mr. Carrick did not comiiit the
burglary. The two additional alibi witnesses, inturn, would have provided amuch-needed
boost to the credibility of Mr. Carrick's defense as presented at trial. This is critical
because trial counsel's defense focused on highlighting Mr. Carrick's alibi. Botli Ms.
Dawson andMs. Stoker - along with Mr. Bishop - were with and could account for Mr.
Carrick's whereabouts during the most critical points intime when the burglary occiorred.
Further, had trial counsel adequately investigated the important alibi witn
including the alibi testimony ofMr. Bishop, he would have realized and developed
timeline to clearly demonstrate that Mr. Carrick did not have the opportunity to comnliit the
burglary. This would have directly contradicted the evidence presented by the prosec ution
attrial nottomention establishing thetheory ofimpossibility according tothemarker:
asthe Call-Detail Report. Trial counsel's errors had a pervasive effect onthe infer
to be drawn from the evidence, thus altering the entire evidentiary picture. Stricklan^, 466
U.S. at 695-96.






evidence to support a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's failure to
10
adequately investigate Mr. Bishop, as an important alibi witness, the result at trial would
have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at694,104 S.Ct. at2068; State v. Litherland,
2000 UT 76,119, 12P.3d 92; and Templin, 805 P.2d at 187.
"The benchmark for judging any claimofineffectiveness mustbe whethercounsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced ajust result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. Such
isthe case here. The evidence presented on remand together the remand court's findings
of fact demonstrate that trial counsel's deficient performance more likely than not
prejudiced Mr. Carrick's defense. Moreover- the evidence should cause the Court to reach
a definite andfirmconviction thata mistake hasbeenmade. SeeState v. Walker, 743P.2d
191, 193 (Utah 1987).
CONCLUSION
In light ofthe foregoing, Mr. Carrickrespectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand thecase fora new jurytrial. In addition, Mr. Camckrequests that
the Court provide him with any other remedy that the Court deems just and appropriate
under the circumstances.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9*^ dayof December, 2019.
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C.
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